The Sixth Circuit affirms a district court’s dismissal of a suit concerning a contract entered into in foreign country for lack of personal jurisdiction in Ohio over the Defendant, a Russian citizen who does own Ohio realty but is rarely there


The Sixth Circuit affirms a district court’s dismissal of a suit concerning a contract entered into in foreign country for lack of personal jurisdiction in Ohio over the Defendant, a Russian citizen who does own Ohio realty but is rarely there


Plaintiff Richard A. Conn contracted with Defendant Vladimir Zakharov, a Russian citizen, in which Conn would gain a 15% share of a proposed venture by Zakharov’s company. No sooner had Conn moved to Russia to perform the agreement, than Zakharov repudiated the contract. Conn then moved back to the United States.
As to contacts with the U.S., Zakharov attended graduate school at Case Western Reserve University in University Heights, Ohio, and graduated in 2002. Zakharov and his wife own and maintain real estate year round in Pepper Pike, Ohio which Zakharov spent millions of dollars renovating. Zakharov also owns several vehicles registered in Ohio, and maintains a bank account in Ohio, He also spends some time in Ohio each year.
After returning from Russia, Conn sued Zakharov in an Ohio federal court basing jurisdiction on his property ownership. Conn claimed a breach of contract and sought an judicial accounting to determine what a 15% share of the Russian venture would have been. Zakharov moved to dismiss the complaint [1] for lack of personal jurisdiction,[2] forum non conveniens, and [3] failure to state a viable claim.
After discovery relating to the personal jurisdiction issue, the district court granted Zakharov’s motion to dismiss. Finding that Zakharov was not an Ohio resident, the court ruled that, for lack of sufficient Ohio contacts, Plaintiff had not properly served him with process.    Plaintiff filed an appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, affirms. It rules that both Ohio state law and the federal Due Process Clause precluded the district court from finding personal jurisdiction over Zakharov.
The Court begins by citing its decision in International Techs. Consultants v. Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1997). There it stated that “[a] federal court sitting in diversity may not exercise jurisdiction over a Defendant unless courts of the forum state would be authorized to do so by state law—and any such exercise of jurisdiction must be compatible with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution.” [Slip op. 3]
Due process requires that the parties have sufficient contacts with the forum state so that it is fair to subject them to jurisdiction there. The Plaintiff has shown his belief that there is personal jurisdiction over Defendant by suing him in an Ohio federal court. When Defendant challenges such jurisdiction, the Plaintiff has to establish specific facts that personal jurisdiction exists over the non‑resident Defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. However, where, as is the case here, the Defendant has moved to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction and the district court rules on the motion without an evidentiary hearing, the Plaintiff need only make a “prima facie” case that there is personal jurisdiction.
Reviewing the district court’s dismissal de novo, the Court of Appeals concludes that the District Court did not have personal jurisdiction over Zakharov unless [1] Conn proved that jurisdiction was proper under a long‑arm statute of Ohio and [2] the federal Due Process Clause allowed for jurisdiction.


The Court first looks to Ohio state law, which declares that personal jurisdiction is only available if the long‑arm statute confers jurisdiction and jurisdiction is proper under the Federal Due Process Clause. The Court notes that Ohio’s long‑arm statute does not reaches the limits of the Due Process Clause. Therefore, the Court analyzes Federal Due Process law.
Ohio law specifies that it will grant personal jurisdiction over non‑residents if their conduct falls within one of nine listed bases of jurisdiction. In the Court’s view, Conn failed to allege that his claims arose out of, or were related to, Zakharov’s activities in Ohio.
Moreover, federal due process requires that the Defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state so that finding personal jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The Court, therefore limits its analysis to whether Due Process allows the imposition of general jurisdiction under the facts of this case.
Next, the Court points out that, because Conn admits that the suit is not related to any of Zakharov’s contacts with Ohio, Zakharov is not subject to long‑arm jurisdiction under Ohio’s long arm statute. Conn argued that Zakharov’s ownership of Ohio property makes him presumptively subject to the jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.
The Court of Appeals also notes that Ohio law does not hold that a person is a “resident” merely because he owns a residence in the state. “Looking at the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that Zakharov has demonstrated an intent to be an Ohio resident—that is, the intent to remain permanently in Ohio. Zakharov travels to Ohio under a tourist or business visa, which means that he must eventually leave Ohio to return to Russia. The fact that DiMarco [Prouse, Dash & Crouch, L.L.P. v. DiMarco, 887 N.E.2d 1211, 1213‑16 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)] traveled to Canada on a tourist visa was persuasive evidence to the DiMarco court that he had no intent to remain in Canada permanently; Zakharov’s traveling to Ohio under a tourist visa is similarly persuasive to us. Furthermore, Zakharov is not registered to vote in Ohio, does not have an Ohio driver’s license, and has spent an average of only a few weeks a year in Ohio over the past several years.” [Slip op. 9‑10]
Conn then argues that Zakharov was personally served in Ohio, and that this alone confers personal jurisdiction. The Court disagrees that there was personal service on Zakharov. “Even assuming that [Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)] permits jurisdiction based solely on proper, personal service of process on a Defendant who is present within the forum state, there could be no jurisdiction here based on such service.”
“Conn sent service of process through certified mail to Zakharov’s Pepper Pike property. His housekeeper received that process when Zakharov was not in the United States. Sometime later, Zakharov arrived in Ohio and was given the documents. This is clearly not ‘personal service’ as envisioned by Ohio law, which requires that personal service of process be accomplished by the sheriff or bailiff of the jurisdiction, or by a person over eighteen ‘who has been designated by order of the court.’ OHIO CIV. R. 4.1(B). And receipt of service of process through certified mail is not sufficient by itself to convey jurisdiction under Ohio’s long‑arm statute and its accompanying rule of civil procedure.” [Slip op. 11]
Lastly, Conn argues that despite the inapplicability of the long‑arm statute, Zakharov is still subject to jurisdiction under federal general jurisdiction. The Circuit Court disagrees. “First, as we have explained, Ohio law does not appear to recognize general jurisdiction over non‑resident defendants, but instead requires that the court find specific jurisdiction under one of the bases of jurisdiction listed in Ohio’s long‑arm statute. Indeed, to hold otherwise would come dangerously close to collapsing Ohio’s two‑part jurisdictional inquiry into one, an outcome that the Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected. We do acknowledge, however, that courts within the Sixth Circuit have come to inconsistent, and in some cases directly contradictory, conclusions on whether Ohio law recognizes general jurisdiction, with some cases holding that it does and other cases explicitly taking the opposite view or simply holding that Ohio law requires application of the long‑arm statute in order to find jurisdiction over a non‑resident Defendant.” [Slip op. 12]
“Second, even if Ohio law does recognize general jurisdiction over non‑resident defendants, Federal Due Process law does not allow for general jurisdiction based on Zakharov’s contacts with Ohio. As we have explained, the Supreme Court distinguishes between general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction, either one of which is an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” [Slip op. 13‑14]
“Even if we did find that Zakharov’s contacts were sufficient to subject him to the state’s general jurisdiction, we do not believe that exercising jurisdiction would accord with fair play and substantial justice. First, the burden on Zakharov to defend this action in Ohio is heavy because he lives in Russia and would have to travel around the world to engage in litigation.” [Slip op. 16‑17]
“Second, Ohio has no interest in this lawsuit—which involves an alleged agreement that was not negotiated in Ohio, agreed to in Ohio, or intended to be performed in Ohio—when neither party is a resident or citizen of Ohio, foreign law will be applied, and no effects from the dispute will be felt in Ohio.”
“Finally, although Conn clearly has an interest in bringing this action in Ohio, he is not foreclosed from bringing the suit in the District of Columbia—indeed, his counsel agreed at oral argument that this was an option—and Conn may always bring the lawsuit in a Russian court, which he admits would have jurisdiction and would hear the case on the merits, even if the merits appear to be stacked against Conn under Russian law. Therefore, Ohio is not the only forum where Conn may attempt to gain relief from his alleged harm.” [Slip op. 17]
Citation: Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2012).
 


**** Mr. William B. Blanchard (“Bill Blanchard”) is a Real Estate Attorney with offices in St. Charles and Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois. Bill specializes in representing real estate clients for purchases and sales as well as home owner real estate tax assessment appeals. Mr. Blanchard is General Counsel for Gaia Title, Inc. a title insurance agency and settlement services provider. The Company is owned by real estate attorneys who demand exemplary title insurance services and accurate and efficient settlement services. As General Counsel he is responsible for title examination, commitment and policy review, escrow settlement supervision and regulatory review. - Attorney Profile: https://solomonlawguild.com/william-b-blanchard%2C-esq - Attorney News: https://attorneygazette.com/william-blanchard%2C-esq#40b43d7b-94b2-48d3-b055-1979a636f1e7

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